DoLS in Care Homes: A Manager's Guide

This guide explains how the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards apply to care homes in England. It is general guidance on the statutory framework, not legal advice, and it does not replace your supervisory body's local procedures or the Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice. The legislation and case law in this guide were checked on 14 October 2026.

The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards remain the operative system for authorising a deprivation of liberty in a care home. That is worth stating plainly, because a great deal of sector commentary has been written as though they were on the way out, and managers reasonably ask whether the process they are following is still the right one.

It is. Schedule A1 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 — the schedule that contains DoLS — is in force. It carries a prospective repeal by Schedule 2, paragraph 2(c) of the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019, the Act that would replace DoLS with the Liberty Protection Safeguards. That repeal has not been commenced. Until it is, Schedule A1 is the law, and an unauthorised deprivation of liberty is unlawful today regardless of what replaces the scheme later.

Where your duty comes from

Two provisions sit behind the whole process.

Section 4A(1) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 sets the default position: "This Act does not authorise any person ('D') to deprive any other person ('P') of his liberty." Everything else is an exception to that sentence — a Court of Protection order, the section 4B route for life-sustaining treatment or a vital act while a decision is sought from the court, or an authorisation under the safeguards.

Regulation 13(5) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 puts the same duty into your registration: "A service user must not be deprived of their liberty for the purpose of receiving care or treatment without lawful authority."

That second one is why DoLS is a CQC matter and not purely a local-authority one. An unauthorised deprivation is a breach of a fundamental standard, and it sits inside Regulation 13 — the safeguarding regulation.

What counts as a deprivation of liberty

This is the judgement most homes find hardest, and the law on it changed in 2026. If your policy, your training or your assessment template still describes an "acid test", it is out of date.

The Mental Capacity Act does not define deprivation of liberty itself — it takes the meaning from article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is why the question turns on case law.

For twelve years the governing authority was P v Cheshire West and Chester Council [2014] UKSC 19, decided on 19 March 2014. It asked two things — whether the person was under continuous supervision and control, and whether they were free to leave — and proceeded on the basis that someone lacking capacity under the Act could not validly consent to their own arrangements. That approach has been overruled. In A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland [2026] UKSC 16, handed down on 2 June 2026, the Supreme Court held at [207]:

"For the reasons we have given, we decline to follow Cheshire West and would overrule it. The so-called acid test has never been adopted by the European court and is wrong in principle."

The Department of Health and Social Care records that the change applies "with immediate effect".

What replaces it

The assessment is now multifactorial. At [184] the Court held that applying the old two-part test "is not sufficient by itself to show that there is a deprivation of liberty", and that a court "must focus on their concrete situation and must take account of the whole range of factors in the particular case, including the type, duration, effect and manner of implementation of the measures in question." At [186] it added that "no single factor is determinative."

DHSC's guidance on the judgment lists the matters to weigh: the type of restrictions, their duration, their effects on the person, the manner of their implementation, whether the person objects, how far the case is removed from detention in a prison cell, the relative normality of the arrangements, and the purpose of the arrangement — care and protection rather than punishment or coercion.

Resist the urge to turn that into a new checklist. The Court's objection to the old test was precisely that it drew a bright line which "wrongly isolated a small sub-set of factors and elevated it to a universal test". A scoring sheet built from these eight headings would repeat the error in different clothes. They are matters to weigh together, for the individual in front of you.

Three things that have changed in practice

A settled, compliant resident is now less likely to be deprived of their liberty — not automatically so. At [187] the Court held that the earlier decision "was wrong to conclude … that a 'person's compliance or lack of objection' is never legally relevant to the question of objective confinement." Where arrangements match a resident's known wishes and they are content with them, that now counts against a deprivation of liberty. But compliance is not the same as consent: the Court noted at [188] that mere acquiescence "may carry little weight … particularly if it is accompanied by the administration of sedative medication which is capable of suppressing objections."

A resident may give valid consent to a deprivation of liberty even without capacity to decide on their care and residence. DHSC's guidance is explicit that "a person may be able to give valid consent in relation to a deprivation of liberty even if they lack legal capacity to consent to their care and residence under the MCA 2005" — where they are conscious of their environment, have a basic level of understanding, and can express a view that they accept or are happy with the situation. Where there is serious doubt, no conclusion of valid consent can be drawn.

Ordinary care home practice is still relevant, just no longer decisive. Keypad front doors, staff accompanying residents outside, decisions made for someone about where they live — these remain factors in the assessment. What has gone is the rule that made them, by themselves, the answer.

Where doubt remains, still refer

DHSC expects the judgment to "reduce significantly the number of deprivation of liberty authorisations" in the long term, while warning that "in the short term … a more cautious approach will be needed, with borderline cases referred for review." Its guidance tells practitioners to "continue to use DoLS processes and court applications where there is any doubt as to whether arrangements constitute a deprivation of liberty", including "where there are any doubts about valid consent, where restrictions are significant or where it appears ECHR article 5 may be engaged."

That is the defensible posture for a home. A borderline case referred to the supervisory body is a decision you can explain. A borderline case closed on the home's own view with nothing written down is not.

DHSC has said it will publish further interim guidance with practical case studies. NHS England published updated MCA and DoLS e-learning material on 30 July 2026, and DHSC says further revised materials are due by December 2026. Check the current position on both before rewriting your own policy.

Your role: the managing authority

In DoLS terms, the care home is the managing authority. The local authority is the supervisory body. Those labels matter because the duties are split, and yours are the ones that start first.

Schedule A1 begins by setting out when it applies. Paragraph 1(2) states the first condition: that a person "is detained in a hospital or care home — for the purpose of being given care or treatment — in circumstances which amount to deprivation of the person's liberty." Paragraph 1(3) adds the second condition, "that a standard or urgent authorisation is in force", and paragraph 1(4) that the authorisation relates to that person and that home.

Paragraph 2 then gives the permission: "The managing authority of the hospital or care home may deprive P of his liberty by detaining him as mentioned in paragraph 1(2)."

Read those together and the structure is clear. The lawfulness of what you are doing depends on an authorisation being in force — not applied for, not pending, in force. Which is what urgent authorisations exist to bridge.

Urgent and standard authorisations

A standard authorisation is granted by the supervisory body after assessment. You request it; they assess and decide.

An urgent authorisation is one you give yourself, as managing authority, where the deprivation needs to begin before a standard authorisation can be obtained. It is the only part of this process where you hold the pen.

The duration is tightly capped. Paragraph 78 of Schedule A1 provides that the period of an urgent authorisation "must not exceed 7 days."

It can be extended once, but not by you. Under paragraph 84, the supervisory body may extend it "if it appears to them that—(a) the managing authority have made the required request for a standard authorisation, (b) there are exceptional reasons why it has not yet been possible for that request to be disposed of, and (c) it is essential for the existing detention to continue until the request is disposed of." Paragraph 85(3) caps that extension too: "That period must not exceed 7 days."

So the outer limit on an urgent authorisation is 7 days, plus a further 7 only where the supervisory body agrees those three conditions are met. Fourteen days is the ceiling, not the allowance — and the extension is contingent on you having already made the standard request. An urgent authorisation running alongside no request is not an extendable position; it is an expiring one.

In practice, supervisory bodies in many areas carry substantial assessment backlogs, and standard authorisations are routinely not determined within the urgent window. Be clear about what that leaves you with. Under paragraph 89, an urgent authorisation "ceases to be in force at the end of the period stated in the authorisation", and the DoLS Code of Practice says the authority to deprive the person of liberty "will cease once the urgent authorisation period has expired". A pending request does not keep it alive, and you cannot give a fresh urgent authorisation for the same detention — so from that point Schedule A1 is not authorising the deprivation, and the Code is plain that "it is unlawful to deprive a person of their liberty without authorisation". If your standard request went in no later than the urgent authorisation, as the Code requires, and any extension request was made promptly, before it ran out, the assessments should have been completed before the urgent authorisation expired — that deadline sits with the supervisory body. What closes the gap is lawful authority: a standard authorisation actually being granted, a Court of Protection order, or — only where the deprivation is needed for life-sustaining treatment or a vital act, while a decision is sought from the court — section 4B. The alternative is arrangements that no longer amount to a deprivation of liberty. A refusal provides no authority: unless one of those other routes applies, the deprivation must stop or the arrangements must change. So escalate in writing, keep reviewing whether the restrictions can be reduced, and keep the request date, any extension request, the chase record and the escalation. They record the steps you took; they do not authorise the deprivation.

The six qualifying requirements

A standard authorisation is only granted where the person meets all six requirements. Paragraph 12(1) of Schedule A1 names them:

(a) the age requirement; (b) the mental health requirement; (c) the mental capacity requirement; (d) the best interests requirement; (e) the eligibility requirement; (f) the no refusals requirement.

You do not assess these — the supervisory body's assessors do. But knowing the list is useful, because it tells you what a refusal means. An authorisation refused on the eligibility requirement usually means the person should be under the Mental Health Act instead, which is a different conversation entirely. One refused on no refusals means there is a valid advance decision or a deputy or attorney decision that conflicts. And one refused on best interests means the assessor concluded the arrangements are not in the person's best interests — which is a finding about your care plan, not a paperwork outcome.

A refusal never means "carry on as you were." Unless one of the other lawful routes described above applies, it means the deprivation must stop or the arrangements must change.

Notifying CQC

This is a separate duty and an easy one to miss.

Regulation 18 of the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009 sets out the incidents a registered person must notify. The DoLS duty is not in the general incident list at 18(2) — it sits separately at 18(4A) and (4B), which is why a manager reading 18(2) alone can reasonably conclude there is no DoLS notification duty at all.

Regulation 18(4A) names the two events: "any request to a supervisory body made pursuant to Part 4 of Schedule A1 to the 2005 Act by the registered person for a standard authorisation", and "any application made to a court in relation to depriving a service user of their liberty pursuant to section 16(2)(a) of the 2005 Act."

Regulation 18(4B) then fixes the timing — and it is one notification, not two: "Any notification required to be given in respect of an event in paragraph (4A) shall be given once the outcome of the request or application is known or, if the request or application is withdrawn, at the point of withdrawal". It must state the date and nature of the request, whether it was preceded by an urgent authorisation, the outcome or the reason for withdrawal, and the date of that outcome or withdrawal.

So the sequence is: you give the urgent authorisation, you request the standard authorisation, and you notify CQC once the outcome is known — or at the point you withdraw the request. There is no separate notification due at the moment you apply. Note the requirement to state whether an urgent authorisation came first: the notification is the record that ties the two together. A home with DoLS applications in its records and no corresponding notifications is a common and entirely avoidable finding. Our guide to CQC statutory notifications covers the submission routes.

Where LPS has actually got to

The Liberty Protection Safeguards were enacted in the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 and have never been brought into force. The repeal of Schedule A1 sits on the statute book waiting for a commencement order that has not been made.

The honest position for a care home is that DoLS is what you must operate now, that any LPS implementation would come with a lead-in period and new statutory guidance, and that no practical preparation is possible or required beyond keeping your mental capacity work in good order. Capacity assessments, best-interests decisions and records of least-restrictive alternatives are the foundation of both schemes. Time spent on those is not wasted whichever system ends up applying.

Be wary of training and guidance that presents LPS as imminent. Some of it has been in circulation, unchanged, for several years.

What to check this month

Every resident whose care involves significant restrictions has a recorded multifactorial assessment of whether those arrangements amount to a deprivation of liberty — and where they do, current lawful authority for it: an authorisation in force, a Court of Protection order, or, only where the deprivation is needed for life-sustaining treatment or a vital act, the section 4B route while a court decision is being sought. A pending request is none of these. Any case where the arrangements amount to a deprivation and no such authority is in place — including where the urgent authorisation has run out with the standard request undecided — is listed separately, with the request date (if no request has gone in, make it now), any extension request, a dated chase record, the escalation, and a recorded review of whether the restrictions can be reduced.
Authorisations granted under the pre-2026 test have been re-examined against the current one, with the reasoning recorded. DHSC expects "many people currently subject to DoLS authorisations who no longer fall in scope", whose cases should be reviewed "as soon as is practicable" — while noting that leaving an authorisation in place meanwhile "does not mean the person is being unlawfully deprived of their liberty."
No urgent authorisation has been running for more than 7 days without a supervisory body extension, and none has been "renewed" by the home — you have no power to do that.
Every standard-authorisation request and court application has a CQC notification filed once its outcome is known, or at the point it was withdrawn.
Conditions attached to standard authorisations are actually being met. Authorisations are frequently granted subject to conditions that then live in a file rather than in the care plan.
Expiry dates are diarised. An authorisation that lapses unnoticed converts lawful care into unlawful detention on a date you could have seen coming.
Restraint in use — lap belts, bed rails, sedation, door practices — is recorded against a capacity assessment and best-interests decision, as Regulation 13(7) defines restraint to include restricting liberty of movement "whether or not the service user resists".

For how this evidence sits inside your wider governance record, see our guide to Well-Led evidence.

This is general guidance based on the published Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 and the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009 and the Supreme Court judgment of 2 June 2026, all checked on 14 October 2026. DoLS procedures vary between supervisory bodies and the Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice governs practice in detail — check your local procedures and the current guidance on cqc.org.uk. Not legal advice.

Sources

Capacity assessments, best-interests decisions, authorisation expiry dates and the notifications that go with them are exactly the records that scatter across a home. InspectReady keeps them together and flags what is coming due, built for independent care homes rather than enterprise chains. Start your free trial — 14 days free, no card required.